Is the Iraqi Invasion a harbinger of worse to come?
2003-05-02
IN THIS COLONIAL WAR the United States fought in Iraq, invading
it to rearrange the political map of the Middle East, Washington
presumed that only one worldview is accepted: its own. It would
not allow any opposition, amongst its citizens or international
bodies like the United Nations, not for the weapons of mass
destruction it claimed Iraq had, but to overthrow the Saddam
Hussein regime. The United States has a long history of
destroying its clients when they get to act independently of
Washington's dictates. And Saddam Hussein was once a client, as
Osama bin Laden was, and many a third world dictator it now finds
would not continue to dance to its tune.
What is frightening at this colonial invasion of Iraq is how
out of touch with reality the United States is. In embarking on
it, Washingtonn was certain the majority Shia community would
welcome it with open arms, and as one commentator noted, its most
difficult problem would be how to deal with the floral tributes
the grateful Shia community, long repressed under Saddam Hussein,
would welcome them. Today, the most potent organised opposition
is that very same Shia community. It miscalculated and misjudged
every step in this invasion. What was to have been a quick
surgical operation is now messy, that the very men in the
Pentagon who promised a quick, sharp, easy victory now think they
would be in Iraq for "at least five years", perhaps more. Every
hopeful expectation is forgotten, as the invading army turns into
an occupation army.
The Anglo-American destruction of Baghdad is as bad, if not
worse, than Hulegu Khan's in 1258. Then the Tigris waters turned
black with the ink of its priceless libraries; today the skies
of Baghdad are dark with the smoke from the burning libraries. It
is this that will be remembered long after the United States has
gone on to pacify other inconvenient states. It now appears there
was a deliberate pattern in the looting, the destroy the past so
the present could be rebuilt anew, so Iraq would be a culture
without a past, like the United States, and thereby create a
culture in Washington's likeness. Cultural destruction will
remain in the people's mind long after the event that led to it
is forgotten. In England, it is the destruction of the
monasteries, and the destruction of its priceless treasures, is
remembered than King Henry VIII, who ordered it. We have
forgotten Hulegu Khan, not what he did. In fact, the worse
destruction came later the 13th century, when his cousin, Timur
the Lame, Tamerlene in the West, sacked Baghdad, but that is
all but forgotten.
It now comes clear the Anglo-American aim was to destroy the
Saddam Hussein regime, not the weapons of mass destruction it
claimed the regime had. It found nothing. Even it does now, would
it be Iraq's, or something put there after the fact to prove the
point of the war? But in destroying the Saddam Hussein regime in
Iraq, it did not plan how to restore the peace. All it was
interested in was to rearrange Iraq in an American image, with
colonial governors and potentates telling a proud people that
they are not learned in how to run their own governments, and
they must be tutored from the basics.
That had, in other words, to destroy Iraq in order to save
it. It had done that twice in the past: in Japan and in
Afghanistan. In Japan, the United States wisely worked with the
existing regime, the changes made acceptabed because of the
ingrained Buddhist belief in bowing down to the victor. That
helped the US along but that is changing. The Japan today is more
confident and assertive now because the policy makers, born after
the San Francisco Treaty in 1953, which formally ended the war
with Japan, have no mental baggage of Buddhist subservience to
the United States. In Afghanistan, it went in to destroy the
government led by its proteges, the Taliban, bombed the country
with such bombs that decades after, children would be destroyed
by it, put a puppet administration in place, and left. In Iraq,
it would have to stay, whether it likes to or not, and face
constant antagonism from the people.
The 24-hour Western TV stations reported the Iraq invasion
from the usual hype of American military commanders those who
heard it in Sagin would recognise. No attempt was made to see how
their perception of the war is received on the ground. Indeed,
when the Arab TV channels, Al Jazeera being only one ot them,
showed the human casualties of the precision bombs that went
astray, Washington moved heaven and earth to have then not
broadcast. In this war, Washington would admit to no casualties
it would not admit. But this monocular view is what puts it in
the quagmire it is in.
For here is another view, from a senior Iraqi official,
close to Saddam Hussein, who was in London in business, telling a
senior Malaysian politician, with whom he went to school, as the
invasion began. Two years ago, Saddam Hussein decided the US
would attack him, said Iraq lost 125,000 dead in the first Gulf
War, 1.5 million in the sanctions regime that followed, and
decided to break up his fighting forces into guerrilla groups.
Two months before the invasion, he ordered the dispersal of his
front line troops, replaced them with volunteers and soldiers
from other formations. This was done. This obviously was unknown
to the Americans, who while claiming the Republican Guards have
been routed, have produced few guns. A force of 300,000 would
have, at the very least, 300,000 weapons of choice, either an M16
or an AK47. For an army that has been reduced to surrender,
precious few ammunition is recovered.
If this is true, and there is no reason why could not, this
is a far more dangerous threat than the Shiite demonstrations
would suggest. If these guerilla groups have melted into the
crowds, waiting for the day they could cause their havoc, the US
is in for a far stickier time than they could imagine. For with
political protests above grounds, and the guerilla bands roaming
across the deserts, and the US supply lines with Baghdad as
tenuous, with the pressure of Christian fundamentalist groups out
to Christianise Muslim Iraq, its repercussion would be most
severe beyond its borders. If Washington's main accusation
against the Saddam Hussein regime is that the minority Sunni
leaders browbeat the majority Shia, then by the same gambit it
must act against President Bashir Assad, for he represents the
minority Shia community browbeating a Sunni majority into
submission. This it cannot do, for that would add to its problems
in Iraq and more pressure from Iran.
If the US aim was to help Israel by destroying its most
potent military threat, Iraq, it cannot now be sure. For what the
Iraq invasion has done is to unite the Muslims in the Middle
East, Shia and Sunni, that Israel and the United States would
face opposition from them for a long time to come. The US cannot
leave Iraq except in defeat, and the Muslims would unite to that
end. It would not happen today, but I fear the longer the US
remains in Iraq, the more nebulous the gains it had hoped for in
deciding to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime. It could well be
Israel that would rue the day the Anglo-American force marched
into Iraq. There is, if what is talked of in the Arab street is
true, a surfeit of Muslim gallants prepared to sacrifice
themselves, in the name of Islam, to rid the Middle East of the
likes of the United States. Suddenly, the United States has
opened up more fronts than it can deal with.
[I wrote this for my column in Seruan KeADILan in its latest
issue, out this week]
M.G.G. Pillai
pillai@mgg.pc.my
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This archive was created as a tribute to the late veteran
journalist MGG Pillai. We believed his writings are useful to develop a critical
thinking analysis.
By the way, the original mggpillai.com web site (2001-2006) was actually created
by one of us.
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