MGG Pillai Commentary View

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The BN is caught in its own trap as the election campaign winds down

AT EVERY MALAYSIAN GENERAL election, the governing coalition, once known as the Alliance and now the National Front (BN), had the edge. It has dominated politics since the first in 1955. It has governed all the states but it has now lost control of two Malay states and could well, if it loses ground, two more. But for the first time, in the 2004 election, the old magic did not work. It did not know until 48 hours before polling tomorrow (21 March 2004) that the ground shifts from it. The BN president, Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, went into the polls believing all is well, that the Anwar shock in 1999 would not bother it now, the same short term magic of the past would damn the Opposition as it almost always has. But his optimistic hopes for an electoral sweep - he aims for a four-fifths majority in parliament - had to be drastically revised downwards as the BN had to fight for every inch of ground. And the stark reality that every plan to trap the Opposition backfired on it instead. The arrest of two BN workers for entrapment shocked the BN heirarchy and it quickly distanced itself from it. Its plan failed. It is not difficult to see why. Those who would have carried out this plan include those who moved to PAS and KeADILan after Dato' Seri Anwar was sacked, humiliated and jailed. They moved to neutralise the BN plan.

Pak Lah's BN went on a media blitz to hide its unpreparedness. In many areas of the country, there was none. Since the BN campaign blitz is oiled by large dollops of money, the lack of it ground it to a halt in many key constituencies up and down the country. The arrogant selection of candidates caused a virtual civil war in every BN component party, and this flowed over into the campaign itself. Important party officials dropped as candidates just moved away to other states to work for their return into UMNO's inner circle in the June party elections. The official and mainstream media would not report on this, but its sycophantic coverage of the BN was overdone, and helped move voters to the Opposition. The BN, staring defeat in its face, went on the offensive: it attacked PAS leaders, notably the Kelantan and Trengganu mentris besar, Dato' Seri Nik Aziz Nik Mat and Dato' Seri Abdul Hadi Awang. That backfired. The electoral frustrations within BN forced the candidates to campaign on the component party symbols. In some areas, like in Kampung Bharu, the UMNO flags were more in evidence than the BN.

The BN decided to dislodge PAS in Kelantan and Trengannu and prevent it from taking power in Perlis and Kedah. As it went deeper into it, it found Kelantan and Trengganu all but impregnable, and its defences in the other two northern states shot to pieces. The does not mean PAS could romp home here, but it would have a greater presence in the two state assemblies that it thought possible. Pak Lah and the deputy prime minister, Dato' Seri Najib Tun Razak, concentrated their fire on PAS in the four states, and ignored the other vulnerable states. One UMNO insider said that Pahang and Selangor also faces a PAS barrage; could Pak Lah hold his ground if Perlis and Kedah is retained but lose the BN's two-thirds majority in Pahang and Selangor? The traditional view is accepted: that the states from Selangor to Johore is firmly in its hands, but that it is not made the BN panic. But it cannot get its election machinery to work overtime to correct this, as once it could. The only ones interested in the election is the mainstream media and the Election Commission, each making and reporting statements as unrelated to reality as could be. One must look hard to see signs of an election, for the city and its environs show no signs of it. Where the candidates are locked in battle, especially in the Malay ground, there is more interest than is normal. But a visitor from overseas would be surprised to be told Malaysia was amidst an election campaign.

The Election Commission takes much of the blame for this. It changes the rules as the campaign proceeds so that there is no doubt the BN would be returned as it wants. It imposes petty restrictions on the run so that even the committed BN voter knows his vote is unimportant. It fixed the polling day to clash with the large crowd puller, the F-1 motor race in Sepang. Yet it hopes for more than 70 per cent of the electorate to vote. How it could it would not explain, but it would - by hook or by crook. The voters are conditioned to yet another BN government, and those who traditionally would vote for the BN is less inclined because of it. His vote does not matter, so why should be bother. But the voter who is committed to vote for the Opposition would do so not matter what. One observer noted: 'There is no oomph in this campaign, so the urge to vote is not there if it is meant for the BN.' This could be disastrous in many constituencies where the BN candidate is neck-to-neck with the Opposition candidate. This electoral apathy is compounded for the BN because its machinery is struck down from within or is disastrously short of money. The BN organisation runs on a shoestring on the ground, and it compensates for that with claims from the leaders in the media.

The Opposition, on the other hand, is used to the BN's attempts to push them into a corner. PAS, particularly, has gone its own way to create an electoral machine that puts fear into BN. It has worked the Malay ground so assiduously and especially since 1999 that it has an army of volunteers to deflect the BN's attempt to take charge of voters in their constituencies. It does not expect to win big, so it does not worry as much as the BN does. Its self-confidence has risen as the BN stumbles in confusion. This is not to suggest that the BN would lose much ground. It would not. But victory this time comes at a high price. What this election would show is that the Opposition, at last, has come on its own, and the BN no longer can take victory for granted. It is for the BN to repair itself if it wants to be a force in 2009 and beyond. It would, for a change, have to match the Opposition PAS and its partner in Barisan Alternatif (BN) in its organisation and policies, and fight the harder for the vote than it ever had to. Which is why a two-thirds majority or more for the BN does not worry the Opposition as in the past.

M.G.G. Pillai
pillai@streamyx.com