The Abu Sayyaf Kidnap and Malaysia's submarine base in Sabah
2000-09-18
The Malaysian cabinet, we are told, orders the armed forces to patrol the
seas off the coast of Sabah, deploy troops in all resort islands, and have
the Abu Sayyaf rebels shiver in their pants should it kidnap Malaysians
ever again. Why did the defence minister, Dato' Seri Najib Tun Abdul
Razak, take a national security operational matter to the cabinet?
Should not the armed forces be deployed not because the cabinet wants it
to, but to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country? Does it
require cabinet approval to do that? Why was not the cabinet -- if indeed
it is this price-fixing body which should approve armed forces' movements
-- then depoloyed in April when the larger crisis broke out? And would
the cabinet tell us whether Sipadan Island, which with neighbouring
Litigan, has resorts operated by the Prime Ministerial son? And if they
are Malaysia's, why did Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta refer their contending
claims to ownership of these two islands to the International Court of
Justice at the Hague?
The defence minister now says the three Malaysians kidnapped from
Pandanan resort in Semporna Island in Sabah is to be left to the mercy of
whoever kidnapped them and the Philippines Air Force bombing on suspected
rebel positions in Jolo Island, where they are believed to be. He now
says it is Manila's internal matter and Malaysia would not matter. This
suggests that Malaysia did interfere when the foreigners were among the
hostages from Sipadan Island. So, what is what? What is Malaysia's
position about the kidnap? What diplomatic measures has it taken to
rescue the three hostages? Or is he telling us that the previous lot of
Malaysians kidnapped were rescued, with at least US$1 million paid for
each release, because foreign tourists were kidnapped with them?
Or is this yet another sandiwara in which security concerns in the
Sabah seas are highlighted to force through Malaysia's plan for a
submarine base at Sepanga Bay in Sabah? What the Malaysian armed forces
need is not more weaponry or technical toys, like fighter aircraft and
submarines, but more professionalism and better training. Turning the
soldiers into actors, and allowing actors to hoodwink the soldiers, as in
the Grik arms heist, does not make for a professional army others would
not dare to tread on. When Malaysia decided five years to buy a
submarine, it led to an arms race. Singapore bought a submarine, from
Sweden, which it has commissioned, with another due to join the fleet
soon. Before the first arrived, two crews were in Sweden for training,
and further crews would be sent for the next.
The island republic pointed to Malaysia's purchases to justify its
submarine purchases. Malaysia, as usual, went into submarine buying
without thought or relevance, and the need for submarines affirmed not for
its operational needs, but because this expensive bauble would spread the
largesse around and make regional navies frightened of Malaysian fire
power. For some strange reason, Malaysian armed forces operational
policies assume that when its soldiers, airmen and sailors take to battle
they would be as professional as the Al-Maunah lot were when they spread
fear into the bowels of its professionalism.
So, the question arises if the kidnappings off the coast of Sabah in
April and this month has yet another agenda: the return to national
attention to the Sepanga Bay submarine base. The unusual interest the
Malaysian government made in that kidnap, the widespread belief in Sabah
that there was more than meets the eye over that kidnap, and the presence
of the deputy minister of education, Dato' Aziz Shamsuddin, and the the
former chief minister of Sabah, Tan Sri Yong Teck Lee, with sundry others,
who insisted on interfering in the negotiations as Dato' Seri Najib now
says Malaysia would not, all points to differing groups with a vested
interest in either or both kidnappings. We do not have the soldiers or
the sailors to guard the isolated islands in an area infested with
pirates. The seas off Sabah is not the Straits of Malacca. But the
deputy prime minister, Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, is certain
security forces guarding Sabah's east coast would "deal" with rebels
fleeing the fighting. There is no way it could, not even if all of
Malaysia's men in uniform, policy and armed forces, are sent there to deal
with it.
Is this sudden interest then in the armed forces' well-touted but
unproven capability an orchestrated smokescreen to tell the Malaysian
public that the armed forces cannot operate effectively without a
submarine base in Sabah and those involved in its purchase get commissions
that would come in handy for their next holiday in Ougadougou. How much
does this base cost? Figures of up to RM2,000 million is bandied about,
the technical specifications changed to ensure the most modern equipment
is installed, and the figures keeping changing as more irrelevant
instrumentation is added. Which is why the cabinet rises from its stupor
to order the armed forces to prove its ineffectiveness off the coast of
Sabah.
M.G.G. Pillai
pillai@mgg.pc.my
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This archive was created as a tribute to the late veteran
journalist MGG Pillai. We believed his writings are useful to develop a critical
thinking analysis.
By the way, the original mggpillai.com web site (2001-2006) was actually created
by one of us.
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